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The Uninvited Guest: The Unexpected Damage to Privacy 
from the Expansion of Implied Licenses* 
INTRODUCTION 
In America, as the saying goes, a man’s home is his castle; it is 
the last bastion of privacy and security.1 However, every time we 
open our homes to guests, we voluntarily surrender some of our 
constitutional right to privacy in the home.2 By hanging a knocker and 
building a path to the front door, we implicitly invite strangers—
salesmen, proselytizers, Girl Scouts, and even police officers—to 
come to our front door and speak with us.3 But how broadly should 
the courts interpret this constructive invitation? In State v. Grice,4 the 
Supreme Court of North Carolina went too far by mistaking a narrow 
invitation to knock for an invitation to explore nearly all areas of a 
property.5 
In Grice,6 two detectives acted on an anonymous tip that 
ultimately led them to the defendant’s rural private property.7 When 
the detectives arrived at the property, one went to the front door to 
knock while the other waited in the driveway.8 While standing in the 
driveway, one detective noticed marijuana plants growing in the 
defendant’s backyard.9 The detectives then seized the marijuana and 
later used the plants as evidence to convict the defendant landowner 
for manufacturing marijuana.10 
 
 * © 2016 Isaac A. Rank. 
 1. See Jonathan L. Hafetz, “A Man’s Home Is His Castle?”: Reflections on the Home, 
the Family, and Privacy During the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries, 8 WM. 
& MARY J. WOMEN & L. 175, 175–76 (2012) (“Despite the continuing erosion of [Fourth 
Amendment] protection in other places, including on the streets, in automobiles, at 
airports, and in schools, the home retains a special place in search and seizure law, and 
continues to symbolize a zone of privacy often beyond the reach of the modern regulatory 
state.”). 
 2. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 3. See Craig M. Bradley, “Knock and Talk” and the Fourth Amendment, 84 IND. L.J. 
1099, 1106 (2009) (quoting State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct. App. 1973)). 
 4. 367 N.C. 753, 767 S.E.2d 312 (2014). 
 5. See id. at 765, 767 S.E.2d at 321. 
 6. In this Recent Development, references to Grice and the Grice court refer to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court decision, not the court of appeals or trial court decisions. 
 7. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314. 
 8. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15. 
 9. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 10. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15. 
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Two years before Grice, in Florida v. Jardines,11 the U.S. 
Supreme Court firmly limited the activities and purposes for which 
police may approach a home while acting under an implied license.12 
Yet in Grice, the Supreme Court of North Carolina failed to define 
exactly what kind of guests and types of behavior homeowners permit 
when they impliedly grant a license to approach their home.13  
This Recent Development argues that, by failing to apply the 
restrictions set forth in Jardines or even articulate the scope of the 
implied license, Grice allows law enforcement officers to perform 
warrantless searches on constitutionally protected property. To avoid 
such intrusions, this Recent Development urges the courts and the 
North Carolina General Assembly to limit the scope of implied 
licenses to the standard established by Jardines. 
Analysis proceeds in five parts. Part I provides the background 
necessary to understand the implied license doctrine, plain view 
seizures, and the practice of “knock and talk” investigations. Part II 
discusses the facts of State v. Grice. Part III demonstrates how the 
Grice court failed to apply precedent by highlighting two flaws in the 
court’s interpretation of implied licenses: the effect of Detective 
Allen’s extended presence in Grice’s driveway and the implications of 
Detective Guseman’s approach of the side door rather than the front 
door. Part IV addresses the dangerous consequences of failing to 
apply precedent. These dangers include substantially expanding what 
law enforcement may do without warrants on private property, 
unmooring the implied license doctrine from its legal foundations, 
and eroding citizens’ freedom from wrongful search and seizure in 
their homes. Finally, Part V recommends three improvements that 
would bring North Carolina’s implied license doctrine in compliance 
with the Fourth Amendment and ensure the protection of 
homeowners’ privacy interests. If implemented, these suggested 
changes would alleviate the uncertainty surrounding the scope of the 
implied license in North Carolina. 
 
 11. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013). 
 12. Id. at 1416 (“The scope of a license—express or implied—is limited not only to a 
particular area but also to a specific purpose.”). 
 13. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316. 
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I.  IMPLIED LICENSES, “KNOCK AND TALKS,” AND PLAIN VIEW 
SEIZURES 
A. An Introduction to the Issues: Implied Licenses and Plain View 
A basic history of Fourth Amendment privacy protections and 
limits on search and seizure reveals how Grice exposes homeowners 
to potentially unconstitutional invasions of their privacy interests in 
the home. The issues at stake in Grice include the (1) underlying 
principles of the Fourth Amendment and the warrant requirement, 
(2) implied license doctrine, (3) police investigations under an implied 
license, and (4) plain view doctrine. 
The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures	.	.	.	.”14 This protection extends 
outside the walls of the home, to the curtilage, which is “the land or 
yard adjoining a house [usually] within an enclosure.”15 The warrant 
requirement presumptively prevents the search or seizure of private 
property absent a warrant issued on probable cause, though 
exceptions exist.16 Two approaches have developed to identify when a 
Fourth Amendment violation has occurred. The first is the privacy-
rights doctrine, originating with Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz 
v. United States,17 which relies chiefly on citizens’ reasonable 
expectations of privacy.18 The second school of thought is property 
 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 15. Curtilage, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 16. See, e.g., Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 34 (1969) (“[O]nly in ‘a few specifically 
established and well-delineated’ situations may a warrantless search of a dwelling 
withstand constitutional scrutiny[.]” (citation omitted) (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 
U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (“Searches 
conducted without warrants have been held unlawful	.	.	.	.”); Jones v. United States, 357 
U.S. 493, 497 (1958) (“It is settled doctrine that probable cause for belief that certain 
articles subject to seizure are in a dwelling cannot of itself justify a seizure without a 
warrant.”); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948) (strongly suggesting a 
warrant requirement by stating that the “point of the Fourth Amendment	.	.	.	is not that it 
denies law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw 
from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a 
neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the 
often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime”). 
 17. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
 18. See id. at 360–61 (Harlan, J., concurring); see also Silas J. Wasserstrom, The 
Incredible Shrinking Fourth Amendment, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 257, 267 (1984) (“In Katz, 
the Court overturned this property-based interpretation of the fourth amendment, and 
extended its coverage to unreasonable invasions of privacy regardless of how 
accomplished. From the unarguable premise that ‘the Fourth Amendment protects people 
not places,’ the Court reasoned that the relevant question should not be how, but whether 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016) 
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based, limiting Fourth Amendment protections to the home and 
other physical property—a privacy violation occurs only when a 
trespass on property occurs.19 
A license is a revocable permission given by a land owner to 
others, allowing visitors to enter the owner’s land and perform “some 
act or series of acts” that would otherwise constitute trespass.20 If an 
person is invited onto private property, she has an express license to 
enter the property—the same holds true for an officer, who would be 
permitted to enter even without a warrant.21 However, even when an 
officer does not have a warrant and is not expressly invited, he can 
sometimes rely on an implied license to enter the property.22 An 
implied license (in contrast to express permission) is not given 
verbally—it is “implied from the habits of the country[.]’	”23 Courts 
objectively analyze whether an implied invitation has been extended, 
based on local “custom and the appearance of things[.]”24 
Additionally, the homeowner’s “expectation of privacy” 
reasonably limits the scope of permissible police conduct an implied 
license allows.25 The implied license doctrine is therefore intimately 
rooted not only in common law property rights but also draws on the 
homeowner’s reasonable expectation of privacy.26 Determining 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists involves a two-part 
analysis.27 First, a person must have a “subjective” expectation of 
 
the government has ‘violated the privacy upon which [the individual] has justifiably 
relied.’	” (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351, 353)). 
 19. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1412 (2013) (“When ‘the 
Government obtains information by physically intruding’ on persons, houses, papers, or 
effects, ‘a search within the original meaning of the Fourth Amendment’ has ‘undoubtedly 
occurred.’	” (quoting United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 950 n.3 (2012))); Olmstead v. 
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not 
implicated “unless there has been an official search and seizure of his person, or such a 
seizure of his papers or his tangible material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his 
house ‘or curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure”). 
 20. License, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 21. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 22. Id. at 1415–16. 
 23. Id. at 1404, 1415 (quoting McKee v. Gratz, 260 U.S. 127, 136 (1922) (Holmes, J.)). 
 24. Id. at 1422 (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. Kane, 131 
A.2d 470, 474 (Md. 1957)). 
 25. Bradley, supra note 3, at 1106. 
 26. See id.; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., 
concurring) (“[A] person has a constitutionally protected reasonable expectation of 
privacy.”). 
 27. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring); 68 AM. JUR. 2D Searches and 
Seizures §	9 (2010). 
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privacy in the location that law enforcement seeks to search.28 Second, 
that expectation of privacy must be objectively “reasonable,” 
meaning it is one that society recognizes and validates.29 For example, 
although an individual might subjectively believe that contraband left 
in the open on the front porch is private, most people would not 
objectively consider the visible front porch a place where the 
individual could reasonably expect privacy. 
The plain view doctrine is an exception to the warrant 
requirement. The doctrine outlines three requirements for law 
enforcement to validly seize an item without a warrant.30 “First, the 
police officer must lawfully make an ‘initial intrusion’ or otherwise 
properly be in a position from which he can view a particular area.”31 
Second, the item must possess some quality to make it immediately 
apparent to the officer that she may seize it.32 For example, 
contraband is readily identifiable.33 However, even readily 
identifiable contraband may not be seized under the plain view 
doctrine unless the initial intrusion onto the property is lawful.34 
Furthermore, the doctrine “may not be used to extend a general 
exploratory search from one object to another until something 
incriminating at last emerges.”35 Finally, the third element of the plain 
 
 28. See, e.g., Estate of Wasilchen v. Gohrman, 870 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1130 (W.D. 
Wash. 2012) (holding that the subjective element of the privacy test can be met only if a 
subjective expectation is exhibited by the defendant’s actual conduct). 
 29. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[T]he expectation [must] be one 
that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’	”). 
 30. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 736–37 (1983) (plurality opinion). A notable 
interpretation of this rule is that objects left in the “plain view” of those outside the area 
immediately surrounding a home cannot reasonably be expected to be private. United 
States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294, 316 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 31. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added) (quoting Coolidge v. 
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971)). Lawful access to a location can be made by 
means of an implied license; police, like “newspaper boys, postmen, [and] Girl Scout 
cookie sellers[,]” have an implied invitation to enter private property via the front path, on 
their way to the residence’s primary entrance. State v. Corbett, 516 P.2d 487, 490 (Or. Ct. 
App. 1973). 
 32. Brown, 460 U.S. at 737 (plurality opinion) (“[I]t must be ‘immediately apparent’ 
to the police that the items they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or 
otherwise subject to seizure.” (quoting Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 466 
(1971))). For example, items that are intrinsically illegal for private citizens to possess such 
as illicit drugs, explosives, or certain firearms are immediately apparent contraband. See 
id. 
 33. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 (1986) (holding that 
marijuana plants that officers observed from a public navigable airspace above a 
defendant’s property were adequate to establish the apparent nature of the plants as 
seizable). 
 34. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465–66 (1971). 
 35. Id. at 466. 
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view doctrine requires that the officer have a “lawful right of access” 
to the item itself.36 This right of access frequently springs from an 
exigency, such as a threat that the item will be removed or 
destroyed.37 
B. Supreme Court Precedent 
The implied invitation38 is limited to actions that are customary 
and usual.39 As a result, the justification for the implied license is 
undermined when an officer’s behavior goes beyond what property 
owners would ordinarily tolerate from a visitor.40 In Florida v. Riley,41 
Justice Brennan’s dissent articulated the principle that “[t]he simple 
inquiry whether [a] police officer had the legal right to be in the 
position from which he made his observations cannot suffice[.]”42 A 
court must also inquire whether the expectation of privacy in the area 
searched should be considered reasonable.43 The implied license is 
not an absolute privilege assured to police officers at every home. To 
the contrary, the license can be “limited or rescinded by clear 
demonstrations by the homeowners.”44 
The Supreme Court has accepted the practice of “knock and 
talks,” as within the scope of an implied license and thus as a valid 
reason to enter private property.45 The Fourth Amendment permits 
officers without a warrant to approach a home by the front path and 
knock on the door for the purpose of interviewing any resident who 
answers.46 “The license is limited to the amount of time it would 
customarily take [a visitor] to approach the door, pause long enough 
to see if someone is home, and (if not expressly invited to stay 
longer), leave.”47 However, the Supreme Court has yet to hold 
whether and under what circumstances police officers may conduct 
 
 36. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 757, 767 S.E.2d 312, 316 (2015) (quoting Horton v. 
California, 496 U.S. 128, 137 (1990)). 
 37. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 393 (1978); Coolidge, 403 U.S. at 464. 
 38. That is, the invitation that the implied license extends to potential visitors. See 
Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
 39. Id. at 1415–16 n.2. 
 40. See id. at 1416. 
 41. 488 U.S. 445 (1989).  
 42. Id. at 460. 
 43. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 44. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 762, 767 S.E.2d 312, 319 (2015). 
 45. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“As the majority acknowledges, 
this implied license to approach the front door extends to the police.”). 
 46. Id. at 1416 (majority opinion). 
 47. Id. at 1423 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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knock and talks at entrances other than the front door.48 The Court 
had the opportunity to follow the Third Circuit’s strong stance on 
protecting homeowners’ privacy rights. In 2014, the Third Circuit held 
that the knock and talk exception “requires that police officers begin 
their encounter at the front door, where they have an implied 
invitation to go.”49 But the Supreme Court overturned that court’s 
holding.50 
Florida v. Jardines illustrates both the shifting landscape of 
Fourth Amendment analysis and how the Court might address future 
knock and talk cases. In Jardines, the Supreme Court held that the 
use of a police drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a house was an 
unlawful search because the officers’ activity exceeded the scope of 
the implied license.51 Jardines specified that only a limited scope of 
conduct is invited by the simple action of “hanging a knocker.”52 
Actions that deviate meaningfully from this protocol (i.e., 
approaching the front door, knocking, and waiting briefly) or that are 
not “customary, usual, reasonable, respectful, ordinary, typical, [or] 
nonalarming” will exceed the scope of the implied license and thus 
violate the homeowner’s Fourth Amendment rights.53 
Moreover, Jardines further limited the scope of a license “to a 
specific purpose.”54 While an officer may approach a home and 
knock, seeking an interview with the owner even if the officer lacks 
probable cause or warrant,55 entry made with any other motive does 
not fall within the implied license exception to the warrant 
requirement. Visitors, including police officers, are not “impliedly 
 
 48. Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct. 348, 352 (2014). 
 49. Carman v. Carroll, 749 F.3d 192, 199 (3rd Cir.), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 348 (2014). 
 50. Carroll, 135 S. Ct. at 351–52 (holding that the Third Circuit erroneously relied on 
a previous opinion with respect to knock and talks and also overturning the denial of 
qualified immunity for the police officer). 
 51. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415; see also Carol A. Chase, Cops, Canines, and Curtilage: 
What Jardines Teaches and What It Leaves Unanswered, 52 HOUS. L. REV. 1289, 1293 
(2015) (“[T]he [Jardines] majority opinion—after first reiterating the view that the home 
receives heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment—highlighted the fact that 
the protection granted to the home under the Fourth Amendment extends to the curtilage 
as well.”). 
 52. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 53. Id. at 1415–16 n.2; see also Brown v. State, 392 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1980) (discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s rejection of Florida’s warrantless entry 
statute). In Brown, police drove up a defendant’s driveway after they saw him on the 
porch. Brown, 392 So. 2d at 282–83. Even though members of the public are generally 
permitted to walk up the driveway, police did so at 1:45 a.m., when “at that time of night 
at his back door, [the defendant] could expect privacy.” Id. at 284. 
 54. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 55. Id. at 1415–16. 
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invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order to do 
nothing but conduct a search.”56 This is essentially a property-based 
analysis that roots the inquiry in trespass law by asking whether the 
officers were properly on the private property.57 
Jardines focused on whether police had a license to enter the 
property58 rather than whether the homeowners had a subjective 
expectation of privacy. This is unsurprising because United States v. 
Dunn59 left the subjective expectation of privacy prong of the analysis 
largely impotent60—even significant efforts and clear demonstrations 
of an intent to establish privacy did not invalidate the search.61 The 
Dunn Court held that the defendant had not established a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area surrounding his barn even though 
officers had to cross a perimeter fence, multiple barbed wire fences, 
and a wooden fence in order to reach the barn.62 Justice Brennan 
correctly pointed out in his dissent that if Katz’s expectation of 
privacy test were correctly applied, the Court would have found that 
the defendant expected a barn thus barricaded to be private and that 
society would agree that within such a fortress one could reasonably 
expect privacy.63 However, because the majority employed a 
property-based analysis, the fact that the barn was not sufficiently 
connected to the home meant that it did not enjoy the privacy 
protections that modern property rights analysis reserves largely for 
the home.64 Jardines continued this trend by focusing on implied 
licenses, a property rights concept, although one intimately linked to 
society’s expectations of privacy.65 The Supreme Court of North 
 
 56. Id. at 1416 n.4. 
 57. 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT §	2.3(f), at 62 (5th ed. 2012) (describing the Jardines Court as eschewing 
“the Katz ‘privacy’ approach in favor of a ‘property-rights’ analysis requiring a 
determination of whether the officer’s entry upon the curtilage was outside the 
householder’s ‘implicit license’ to visitors because of the officer’s purpose”). 
 58. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1418 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The Court today treats this 
case under a property rubric[.]”). 
 59. 480 U.S. 294 (1987). 
 60. See id. at 300–03 (analyzing only the factors that support an objective expectation 
of privacy in the curtilage and not analyzing the individual’s subjective expectation of 
privacy). 
 61. Id. at 303–05. 
 62. Id. at 303. 
 63. See id. at 317–19 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan criticized the Dunn majority’s 
refusal to recognize “farmers’ and ranchers’ expectations of privacy in their barns and 
other outbuildings” as expectations society would recognize as reasonable, especially 
when “obvious efforts have been made to exclude the public.” Id. at 319–20. 
 64. Id. at 302 (majority opinion). 
 65. LAFAVE, supra note 57, §	2.3(f), at 62–63. 
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Carolina followed Dunn and Jardines, abandoning the expectation of 
privacy analysis for the property-based approach.66 The Grice court 
was content, as was the U.S. Supreme Court in Jardines, to instead 
undertake a property rights analysis. Although following the Jardines 
analysis, the Grice court expanded the implied license doctrine to 
allow for a greater breadth of police investigative conduct than 
permitted by Dunn or Jardines. 
C. North Carolina and Fourth Circuit Decisions 
Precisely how implied license doctrine and related Fourth 
Amendment principles interact with and apply to different cases, 
including which entrances to the home law enforcement may 
approach and the precise limits of the implied license, remains 
unclear. Without describing exactly what is allowed during a knock 
and talk, the Fourth Circuit has emphasized that the knock and talk 
does not confer “the right to make a general investigation in the 
curtilage.”67 
There is no firm consensus on the degree to which knock and 
talks permit law enforcement to encroach on private property, and 
courts facing the issue have taken varying approaches.68 The Seventh 
Circuit once held that “the Fourth Amendment is not implicated 
when police officers approach [a] door in the reasonable belief that it 
is a principal means of access to the dwelling.”69 This does not mean 
that the approach to a front door is totally unprotected. Rather, a 
case-by-case analysis determines the existence of a privacy interest. 
The Fourth Circuit has held that in certain cases the curtilage of the 
home may retain a protected privacy interest depending on “the 
physical attributes of the house and its surrounding land.”70 Privacy 
interests are accordingly more robust in secluded or rural areas.71 For 
example, a homeowner might not have a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an object on the front porch where a passersby on the 
street could see it, while nonetheless having a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in objects in the backyard because of the more private 
 
 66. See State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 756–65, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315–21 (2015). 
 67. Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 289 (4th Cir. 2001). 
 68. See Bradley, supra note 3, at 1099. 
 69. United States v. James, 40 F.3d 850, 862 (7th Cir. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 
516 U.S. 1022 (1995). 
 70. United States v. Van Dyke, 643 F.2d 992, 994 (4th Cir. 1981) (noting that 
expectation of privacy are heightened when a house is “screened by trees, is located in an 
isolated, rural area with entry provided by a dirt road posted ‘no trespassing’	”). 
 71. See id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016) 
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nature of a backyard.72 Similarly, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
found that areas of private property that are considered a “normal 
route of access” for anyone visiting the home, such as sidewalks or 
driveways, are considered only “semi-private,” as are objects located 
there.73 
The above concepts are essential to understanding the danger 
that the Supreme Court of North Carolina’s holding in State v. Grice 
poses to homeowners’ Fourth Amendment rights. When determining 
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, the homeowner’s 
expectation of privacy must be both subjective and recognized by 
society as objectively reasonable.74 Moreover, in order for an officer 
to make a plain view seizure of an item within Fourth Amendment 
protected property, the officer must have had lawful access to the 
area in which the item is located.75 Lawful access to make a plain view 
seizure can be provided by an implied license.76 Finally, an officer is 
impliedly invited and therefore permitted to approach the front door 
of a home, knock promptly, wait briefly to be received, and then 
leave.77 In State v. Grice, these legal principles should have been 
carefully weighed to determine whether the officers lawfully accessed 
the area where they found contraband on Grice’s property and 
whether they unlawfully seized the contraband.  
II.  STATE V. GRICE 
A. Facts 
In May 2011, Detectives Guseman and Allen received an 
anonymous tip that defendant Jerry Grice, Jr. (“Grice”) was growing 
marijuana.78 They intended to confirm this information by performing 
a knock and talk investigation at Grice’s residence.79 The detectives 
drove one-tenth of a mile down Grice’s dirt driveway and parked in 
the driveway behind defendant’s white pickup truck.80 Grice’s house 
 
 72. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 73. United States v. Hayes, 551 F.3d 138, 146 (2d Cir. 2008); United States v. Magana, 
512 F.2d 1169, 1171 (9th Cir. 1975). But see United States v. Pineda-Moreno, 688 F.3d 
1087, 1091 (9th Cir. 2012) (“We recognize that [United States v. Jones]	.	.	.	may also affect 
the vitality of	.	.	.	Magana.”). 
 74. See supra note 27–29 and accompanying text. 
 75. See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text. 
 76. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
 77. See supra note 45–47 and accompanying text. 
 78. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754, 767 S.E.2d 312, 314 (2015). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016) 
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was in a rural setting, “basically by itself in a field.”81 Upon exiting the 
vehicle, the detectives encountered dogs and saw that the front door 
of the house was barricaded with “plastic wrap” and “furniture 
stacked on the front porch	.	.	.	.”82 After concluding that a side door 
on the house was being used as Grice’s main entrance to the house, 
Detective Guseman approached the side door to knock.83 After 
calming the dogs, Allen remained “off the porch in the driveway[,]” 
and while standing there, he could see into Grice’s backyard.84 At this 
point, Allen noticed several potted marijuana plants in buckets about 
fifteen yards away.85 The plants were located “to the rear and side” of 
an outbuilding that resembled a “homemade shed.”86 After visually 
verifying that the plants were marijuana, both detectives crossed the 
lawn into the backyard where they then seized the plants.87 The State 
later used the plants as evidence to convict Grice of manufacturing 
marijuana.88 
B. The Majority Opinion 
Chief Justice Martin delivered the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina’s opinion in State v. Grice, holding that the implied license to 
approach Grice’s home made lawful the detectives’ entry into and 
presence on Grice’s property.89 The court justified this holding by a 
single invocation of Jardines: “an implicit license	.	.	.	typically permits 
the visitor to approach the home by the front path.”90 The court 
further justified the seizure of marijuana by explaining that “[w]hen 
law enforcement observes contraband in plain view, no reasonable 
expectation of privacy exists, and thus, the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition against unreasonable warrantless searches is not 
 
 81. Id.; New Brief for the State at 4, State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 767 S.E.2d 312 
(2015) (No. 501PA12), 2012 WL 8700379, at *3. 
 82. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 4; see also Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 
S.E.2d at 314. 
 83. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15; see also New Brief for the State, 
supra note 81, at 4. 
 84. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 5; see also Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 
S.E.2d at 315. 
 85. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315; see also New Brief for the State, supra 
note 81, at 5. 
 86. New Brief for the State, supra note 81, at 5. 
 87. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315; see also New Brief for the State, supra 
note 81, at 5. 
 88. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 89. Id. at 754, 762, 767 S.E.2d at 314, 319. 
 90. Id. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 
(2013)). 
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violated.”91 In fact, because the court held that no privacy interest can 
exist in an object found in plain view, the court found that no search 
occurred at all.92 The Grice court’s application of this bright-line rule 
precluded a more fact-specific, contextualized analysis of whether the 
defendant could reasonably expect the plants to be private. 
Although the Grice court invoked Jardines to establish the 
implied license that justified the detectives’ entrance onto the 
defendant’s property,93 the quoted language only permits a law 
enforcement officer to approach a home’s front door. Jardines’s 
language furnishes no justification for the detective’s lingering on the 
driveway, entering the backyard, or approaching the side door.94 
Accordingly, the Grice court did not fully consider law enforcement’s 
practice of knock and talk investigations or the appropriateness of 
officers approaching a side door when conducting such 
investigations.95 Further, the court did not investigate whether Grice 
had a subjective expectation of privacy in his backyard or if such an 
expectation was objectively reasonable.96 If the court had discussed or 
fully considered these well-established doctrines, the result of this 
case may have been different. 
C. Justice Hudson’s Dissent 
Justice Hudson’s dissent, however, touched on some of these 
issues and other potential problems with the plain view seizure of the 
marijuana plants in Grice’s backyard.97 She noted that an observation 
made by an officer who is “located outside of a constitutionally 
protected area and is looking inside that area” is engaged in a 
 
 91. Id. at 756, 757 S.E.2d at 315–16 (citing California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213–15 
(1986)). 
 92. Id., 767 S.E.2d at 316 (citing Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993)). 
 93. Id. at 757, 759, 767 S.E.2d at 316, 318 (“[The] implicit license	.	.	.	typically permits 
the visitor to approach the home by the front path	.	.	.	.	[T]he knocker on the front door is 
treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to the home by 
solicitors, hawkers and peddlers[.]” (emphasis added) (quoting Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. 
Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013))). 
 94. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013); see also Grice, 367 N.C. at 
757–59, 767 S.E.2d at 316–18 (naming the “sole point of contention” to be whether the 
officers had a lawful right of access to the contraband from the driveway). If the Grice 
court intended to narrowly interpret Jardines, it did so implicitly. Had it done so expressly, 
homeowners would better understand the extent of their privacy interests. 
 95. Compare Grice, 367 N.C. at 757–59, 767 S.E.2d at 316–18 (majority opinion), with 
id. at 768–69, 767 S.E.2d at 323–24 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 96. See id. at	754–65, 767 S.E.2d at	314–21 (majority opinion). 
 97. Id. at 767–70, 767 S.E.2d at 322–24 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
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“preintrusion” observation.98 Observations of contraband made from 
a preintrusion standpoint are properly classified as “open view” and 
not “plain view” observations.99 The substantive difference between 
“open view” and “plain view” observations is that an “open view” 
observation does not occur from within a Fourth Amendment 
protected area. Further, “open view” observations do not confer a 
right of access to the object absent exigent circumstances—they 
merely confer probable cause sufficient to obtain a warrant.100 In 
Grice, because the contraband was located in a protected area—the 
backyard101—and the detectives observed it while outside of the 
protected area, they had only an open view of the marijuana plants 
and therefore no right of access absent a warrant or exigent 
circumstances. 
When an officer sees contraband in “open view”—i.e., from 
outside the protected area—only a warrant or exigent circumstances 
justifies entering the Fourth Amendment protected area.102 Justice 
Hudson concluded that there were no exigent or suspicious 
circumstances in this case.103 In her view, the only facts supporting an 
exigency were the chance that someone might be home and that the 
plants could in theory be removed or destroyed.104 She found no 
indication that the plants would be destroyed or even that the 
detectives had made their presence known to anyone in the home.105 
Because there was no evidence that the plants would be destroyed, 
Justice Hudson found that there was no legitimate reason for the 
detectives to seize the plants without a warrant.106 She reasoned that 
the detectives could easily have called in for a warrant, obtained one, 
and then returned to confiscate the property. As Justice Hudson 
implied, the majority’s holding sets a dangerously low bar for what 
 
 98. Id. at 767, 767 S.E.2d at 322; see also Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 352 (Fla. 1981) 
(defining a preintrusion as when “the officer is located outside of a constitutionally 
protected area and is looking inside that area”). 
 99. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352. 
 100. Id. For a detailed explanation of the “plain view” doctrine, see Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–73 (1971). 
 101. Grice, 367 N.C. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 102. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352; see also Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932) 
(holding that evidence of a possible crime “does not strip the owner of a building of 
constitutional guarantees against unreasonable search”). 
 103. Grice, 367 N.C. at 768–69, 767 S.E.2d at 323 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 104. Id. 
 105. See id. at 769, 767 S.E.2d at 323–24. 
 106. Id. 
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constitutes exigent circumstances and threatens to eliminate the 
warrant requirement in many cases.107 
III.  THE GRICE COURT’S EXPANSION OF IMPLIED LICENSE 
DOCTRINE  
By failing to condemn or even analyze the detectives’ actions, the 
Grice court paid little heed to the Supreme Court’s principle that “an 
officer’s leave to gather information is sharply circumscribed when he 
steps off [public] thoroughfares and enters the Fourth Amendment’s 
protected areas.”108 In doing so, the Grice court handed down an 
overly generous interpretation of the scope of the implied license, the 
implications of which are troubling for the future of Fourth 
Amendment protection of the home. 
The events in Grice transpired on Fourth Amendment protected 
property. In North Carolina, it is generally agreed that driveways, 
pathways, porches, lawns, and other areas that must be traversed in 
order to reach the front door of a private house are classified as 
“curtilage.”109 Those locations are, therefore, protected by the Fourth 
Amendment and may not be intruded on by law enforcement without 
a warrant or a valid exception.110 Such an exception might be an 
implied license or perhaps a direct invitation inside by the owner.111 
Given the scope of Fourth Amendment protections, a court should be 
absolutely certain that an officer without a warrant has proper license 
to enter a property before the court allows any seizure of objects 
within the property. Unfortunately, the question received little 
attention from the Grice court.112 This is likely because the defendant 
did not contest the validity of the license at trial and neither statute 
nor case law clearly establishes the scope of implied licenses.113 In any 
case, the issue of implied licenses deserved greater analysis in this 
case. 
 
 107. Id. at 769, 767 S.E.2d at 323. 
 108. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013). 
 109. Grice, 367 N.C. at 759, 767 S.E.2d at 317 (“[T]he curtilage of the home will 
ordinarily be construed to include at least the yard around the dwelling house as well as 
the area occupied by barns, cribs, and other outbuildings.” (quoting State v. Frizzelle, 243 
N.C. 49, 51, 89 S.E.2d 725, 726 (1955))). The Fourth Amendment doctrine of curtilage is 
vast and complicated and is beyond the scope of this Recent Development. 
 110. Id. 
 111. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (explaining that visitors using an implied license do 
not have to leave if they have been invited to stay). 
 112. See Grice, 367 N.C. at	754–65, 767 S.E.2d at	314–21; supra Section II.B. 
 113. Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316. 
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This Part analyzes two major issues presented by Grice, each of 
which, if more fully considered by the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina, may have changed the court’s conclusion that the detectives 
were acting within the scope of an implied license: (1) the effect of 
Detective Allen’s extended presence in Grice’s driveway; and (2) the 
implications of Grice’s barricaded front door. 
A. Detective Allen’s Extended Stay in the Driveway 
The Grice court found that Detective Allen was properly on 
Grice’s land,114 even though Allen exceeded the traditional limits of 
the implied license—to approach the front door, knock, wait briefly 
to be received, and, if no one comes to the door, to leave.115 Rather 
than approaching the home by the front path and knocking promptly, 
Detective Allen, after calming some dogs that ran out to him, 
remained standing in the driveway instead of approaching the door.116 
Further, while standing there, the detective scanned the house and 
curtilage and spotted the buckets containing marijuana.117 Whether 
conducting a search or merely loitering, Detective Allen’s actions 
were outside the scope of the implied invitation to a person who 
approaches the front door.118 
Although the Grice court quoted Jardines, noting that “an 
implicit license typically permits the visitor to approach the home by 
the front path[,]”119 the court conducted no further analysis as to 
whether the detectives were properly on the defendant’s land. 
Admittedly, a factual finding may have shown that, in the defendant’s 
neighborhood, it is acceptable when two people are visiting together 
for one visitor to go to the door while the other visitor waits at a 
distance, but no such findings were made.120 Furthermore, the Grice 
court overlooked a qualification that Jardines made clear: “the scope 
of a license	.	.	.	is limited not only to a particular area but also to a 
specific purpose.”121 The facts suggest that Detective Allen did not 
intend to knock and obtain an interview with the resident of the 
 
 114. See supra Section II.B. 
 115. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415. 
 116. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 117. Id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 118. That is, “to approach the home by the front path, knock promptly, wait briefly to 
be received, and then (absent an invitation to linger longer) leave.” Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 
1415. 
 119. Grice, 367 N.C. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316 (quoting Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415). 
 120. See supra notes 38–53 and accompanying text (describing “custom” as the guiding 
principle of the implied license). 
 121. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
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house; he remained in the driveway to look and observe.122 The Grice 
court may have overlooked this limit on the scope of the implied 
license because courts are generally hesitant to allow the validity of a 
search to hang on the “subjective intent of the officer.”123 But this 
principle should not apply to plain view seizures in this state. The 
North Carolina General Assembly only permits warrantless seizures 
of plain view evidence if the discovery is inadvertent124—essentially 
requiring that the officer neither anticipate finding the evidence nor 
know its location in advance.125 Because the legislature has already 
determined that an officer’s subjective mental state is important to a 
search or seizure’s validity, it should be considered equally as 
important to the license analysis as well. 
In Jardines, the Supreme Court instructed that “no one is 
impliedly invited to enter the protected premises of the home in order 
to do nothing but conduct a search,”126 but it did not address whether 
the customary invitation allows multiple officers to provide backup 
for an officer on the premises.127 Detective Allen may have 
overstepped the boundary of the implied license by waiting in the 
driveway, inspecting his surroundings, and looking into the 
backyard.128 However, it may well be that careful inspection of his 
surroundings was essential for Allen to properly support and protect 
his partner who was knocking on the door. It could additionally be 
argued that calming the dogs in the driveway was essential for police 
safety129—though the record does not indicate that the dogs were 
aggressive. 
Had the Grice court fully examined Detective Allen’s prolonged 
stay in the driveway, it is likely that the court would have found that 
Allen’s actions exceeded the scope of the implied license. At the very 
least, by analyzing Allen’s behavior, the court could have clarified 
 
 122. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21. 
 123. See, e.g., Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (holding that subjective intent is irrelevant 
when a search is objectively reasonable); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990) 
(holding that the requirement that an officer’s discovery of evidence in plain view be 
inadvertent is not an effective standard because “evenhanded law enforcement is best 
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards that 
depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer”). 
 124. See N.C. GEN. STAT. §	15A-253 (2013) (“If in the course of the search the office 
inadvertently discovers items not specified in the warrant which are subject to seizure 
under G.S. 15A-242, he may also take possession of the items so discovered.”). 
 125. See Horton, 467 U.S. at 138 (defining inadvertent discovery). 
 126. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416. 
 127. See id. at 1409–18. 
 128. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text. 
 129. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754–55, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2015). 
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that in North Carolina visitors are impliedly invited to linger in the 
driveway. Doing so would have allowed homeowners to better 
understand the limits of their privacy interests in their own property. 
It should also be noted that Detective Guseman, who actually 
intended to and did go up to the door and knock, did not notice the 
plants—likely because he was busy performing the legitimate purpose 
of his entry.130 Lastly, even failing to examine the detective’s lengthy 
stay in the driveway, the court should have more fully considered 
whether the furniture obstructing the front door limited the scope of 
the implied license. 
B. Furniture Barricading the Door and Detective Guseman’s 
Approach of the Side Door 
The Grice court also neglected to consider whether the 
defendant created a reasonable expectation of privacy by limiting the 
scope of the implied license to enter his land. As previously discussed, 
a homeowner impliedly invites guests to enter his property by 
hanging a knocker.131 But in Grice, the proverbial knocker certainly 
was not hung. On the contrary, the front door was barricaded with 
furniture and covered with plastic.132 It seems troubling that even 
when a person has barricaded the door of his house, there was not 
even a whisper from the Grice court wondering if the implied license 
might have been revoked. By way of example, several circuits have 
held that a homeowner may limit the license and create a reasonable 
expectation of privacy on his curtilage by surrounding it with a fence 
and gate.133 Nor did the Grice court consider the fact that there was 
no path or sign directing visitors to the driveway or to the side door,134 
which could suggest that Grice neither invited nor expected members 
of the public to be in the driveway or at the side door.135 Perhaps no 
guest had ever discovered, much less attempted to use this side door 
at the end of a long, dirt driveway in a rural area.136 By remaining 
 
 130. See id. at 755, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 131. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1415 (“We have accordingly recognized that ‘the knocker on 
the front door is treated as an invitation or license to attempt an entry, justifying ingress to 
the home by solicitors, hawkers and peddlers of all kinds.’	” (quoting Breard v. 
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 626 (1951))). 
 132. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314. 
 133. United States v. Jenkins, 124 F.3d 768, 773 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that land 
surrounded on three sides by fences contributed to the finding of the area as protected by 
the Fourth Amendment); Fixel v. Wainwright, 492 F.2d 480, 484 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 134. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314. 
 135. See id. 
 136. Id. at 754, 767 S.E.2d at 314. 
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silent, the court implied that even if the defendant could reasonably 
expect privacy in his backyard, that privacy interest was overborne by 
the legitimate state interest in seizing contraband, even in the absence 
of exigent circumstances.137 Because the front door was barricaded, 
Grice arguably directed visitors to the functioning side door. But if so, 
the court should have explained its analysis while also taking care not 
to hold that law enforcement may approach any or all doors and 
windows when the front door is unavailable. 
Essentially, the Grice court conflated the first requirement of the 
plain view analysis—lawful access—with the third requirement—an 
immediately apparent right to seize the object.138 Even assuming that 
the detectives had a right to seize contraband, their search failed to 
meet the requirements of the plain view doctrine because the 
detectives did not have lawful access to the side of the house. 
Even ignoring the implications of the barricade, the court should 
not have ignored that an implied license usually grants permission to 
approach only the front door.139 Because the detectives approached 
the side door in this case,140 the court should have paid greater 
attention to whether this conduct was proper. The local custom may 
well have permitted a visitor to go to a side door if the front door was 
blocked. The physical layout of the Grice property may have 
warranted using the side door. If the Grice majority had allowed the 
officers to approach the side door on either of these bases, the 
holding would be relatively narrow and fact specific. The opinion 
should have established that knocking on side doors, back doors, or 
windows is not appropriate in every case but must be specifically 
invited by the physical layout of the property or by local custom. 
Given this confusion, Detective Guseman might have exceeded 
the scope of his invitation when he approached the side door. 
Different circuits have established different rules detailing when 
approaching side doors is appropriate. The Fourth Circuit allows 
officers to approach a door other than the front door only under 
certain circumstances, such as when a homeowner’s car is parked in 
the residence, but no one answers the front door.141 Other 
 
 137. Id. at 762, 767 S.E.2d at 319. 
 138. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990) (listing the requirements of 
the plain view test). 
 139. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013); cf. Lakin v. Ames, 64 Mass. 
(10 Cush.) 198, 220 (1852) (holding that licenses are created and also limited by the local 
customs). 
 140. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 315. 
 141. See United States v. Bradshaw, 490 F.2d 1097, 1099–1100 (4th Cir. 1974). 
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jurisdictions have looser standards, allowing an officer to approach 
another door only when she reasonably believes that the side door is 
used as the primary entrance.142 In Grice, rather than approaching by 
the front path and knocking at the front door, Guseman went up the 
driveway, around to the side door,143 possibly exceeding the spatial 
limits of the implied license. 
The classification of the side door as the main entrance had a 
serious impact on the defendant’s privacy interests. But the court 
engaged in no inquiry as to whether this classification was 
warranted.144 This is particularly troubling because scope of license 
issues are highly fact-bound inquiries with no apparent bright line 
rules. The court should have clarified these murky areas of the law. 
The Grice court allowed the detectives to approach the side door 
because the detectives determined that the side door appeared to be 
the main entrance.145 In many cases this standard will not be 
problematic, but the court should take care to ensure that an officer’s 
belief about which entrance is the main entrance is a reasonable one. 
Wholesale deference to an officer’s subjective beliefs would make it 
too easy to erode the protections of the home and its curtilage. 
In sum, the Grice decision is problematic due to its cursory 
analysis. The court started and ended its inquiry by finding that the 
officers’ initial presence on the property was for the purpose of 
conducting an interview.146 Instead, the Grice court should have 
continued the required fact-based inquiry. First, the court should have 
inquired whether the officers’ continued presence on the property fell 
within the implied license. Second, the court should have examined 
the officers’ actions after they realized the front door was barricaded 
and no one appeared to be home. The initial purpose of their 
presence—to conduct an interview—was mooted. Finally, the court 
should have found that the officers’ continued presence on the 
 
 142. See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 997 F.2d 1273, 1279–80 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding 
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated when officers reasonably 
believed that the back door—a door readily accessible to the public—was the apartment’s 
main entrance); United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990) (upholding 
officers’ approach to a back door when the front door was inaccessible and the officers 
engaged in a legitimate effort to interview the defendant rather than attempting to 
observe whether unlawful activity was underway). 
 143. Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15. 
 144. See id. at 754–65, 767 S.E.2d at 314–21 (setting forth as an accepted fact that “the 
driveway led to a side door, which appeared to be used as the main entrance,” while 
ignoring the issue in the legal analysis). 
 145. Id. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15. 
 146. Id. at 758, 767 S.E.2d at 317 (“Here, the knock and talk investigation constituted 
the initial entry onto defendant’s property[.]”). 
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property was for the purpose of finding contraband, an unlawful 
justification for encroaching on Fourth Amendment protected 
property. 
Jardines stands for the proposition that the Constitution 
continues to limit officers to certain actions and purposes even after 
an officer initially enters property for the purpose of conducting an 
interview.147 This Recent Development urges that if officers 
undertake acts inconsistent with a legitimate purpose, courts should 
consider the scope of the implied license to be breached. If state 
courts do not fully analyze the actions of officers on a case-by-case 
basis, they simply cannot uphold the Constitution. 
IV.  CONSEQUENCES OF GRICE 
By eschewing a case-by-case analysis and not confining police 
actions on private property to a fixed and limited protocol, the Grice 
court created a dangerous precedent for North Carolina. First, the 
decision permits an overly broad range of police actions—including 
generous exemptions for safety—to infringe on Fourth Amendment 
protections. Second, it allows officers to exceed specific, legitimate 
purposes, which encourages exploratory behavior. Third, it 
encourages violations of homeowners’ reasonable expectations of 
privacy. 
A. Broad Range of Police Actions 
If the law does not require police to adhere to a specific protocol 
while on private property, some deviations may be harmless, but 
others may be alarming, invasive, and unconstitutional. The risk of 
violating constitutionally protected property rights is too great to 
refrain from instituting a more stringent protocol. Justice Scalia noted 
in Jardines that “to spot [a] visitor exploring the front path with a 
metal detector, or marching his bloodhound into the garden before 
saying hello and asking permission, would inspire most of us to—well, 
call the police.”148 Allowing officers to lurk and loiter on the driveway 
and front porch, peering through windows for as long as they like, 
seriously threatens the privacy interests at the heart of the Fourth 
Amendment. When officers are given such freedom, all but the 
darkest corners of a home are in “plain view.”  
This is no mere hollow prediction; in some jurisdictions this is 
becoming the reality. The Ninth Circuit has allowed police to walk 
 
 147. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415–16 (2013). 
 148. Id. at 1416. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016) 
1374 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 94 
completely around the house “for officer safety reasons” and to 
“attempt to locate someone with whom they could speak[,]”149 or to 
stand on tires to look over a fence into a person’s backyard.150 
Similarly, the First Circuit has permitted police to go to the back of 
the house and peer in a kitchen window because the front door was 
inaccessible.151 Such privileges run contrary to the logical and legal 
basis of an implied license. Would a reasonable person, when 
deciding not to answer the door, expect a visitor to walk around the 
house peering in windows in an exploratory manner? Should society? 
If not, these actions likely violate the “reasonable expectation of 
privacy” described in Katz and Jardines, and should not therefore be 
permitted.152 An extension of licenses to engage in exploratory 
behavior on a homeowner’s property will devastate North 
Carolinians’ Fourth Amendment interests. 
Perhaps it is necessary to provide police with broad discretion to 
decide how to carry out their duties, in order to allow them to 
perform their jobs safely. Officer safety is often used to justify actions 
that seemingly exceed the implied license, such as allowing officers to 
secure an area by circling a house153 or permitting Detective Allen to 
stand watch in the driveway to provide back-up for his partner.154 It is 
worth asking whether actions necessary for police safety should lie 
within the scope of the implied license. The court might have 
correctly reasoned that by building a path to his door, a homeowner 
implicitly licenses police (and other visitors) to approach his door in a 
reasonably safe way. On the other hand, a homeowner does not 
guarantee that all visitors will be protected from all injuries, and the 
police—like all others—must assume some minor risks when 
approaching private property. The Fourth Amendment does not 
permit protective sweeps of private property to be used as a substitute 
for a warrant, absent reasonably convincing evidence of a potential 
risk.155 If a police officer testified that it was safer for him to batter 
down the doors of a home and search every room and closet, such 
testimony alone would not defeat the Fourth Amendment 
requirement that searches and seizures be reasonable: “[Fourth 
 
 149. United States v. Hammett, 236 F.3d 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2001), overturned in part 
by United States v. Perea-Rey, 680 F.3d 1179, 1187–88 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 150. United States v. Wheeler, 641 F.2d 1321, 1327 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 151. United States v. Daoust, 916 F.2d 757, 758 (1st Cir. 1990). 
 152. See supra Section I.B. 
 153. See, e.g., Hammett, 236 F.3d at 1060 (allowing the officer to circle the house to 
locate another door out of concern for officer safety). 
 154. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 754–55, 767 S.E.2d 312, 315 (2015). 
 155. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968). 
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Amendment] jurisprudence contemplates that protection of 
individual rights of privacy will be achieved at some cost to society’s 
interest in public safety[.]”156 A balance can and should be achieved 
between safety and privacy interests. 
B. Specific Purposes 
Jardines requires that the scope of a license be limited to a 
specific purpose.157 Homeowners do not typically invite guests onto 
their property for the sole purpose of conducting searches.158 Seeing a 
stranger performing searches in one’s yard would greatly alarm a 
reasonable homeowner. Extending licenses for officers to perform 
searches that a homeowner would rarely if ever consent to therefore 
undermines the justification for the implied license. Under such a 
rule, an officer may enter not only to interview the resident but even 
to stand in the driveway casting his eyes about searching for 
contraband not visible from a public road.159 In Grice, Detective 
Guseman actually intended to approach the front door and knock; 
likely because he was busy performing the legitimate purpose of his 
entry, he did not notice the plants, though his partner, loitering in the 
driveway, did.160 
An officer’s intent meaningfully affects what she might find 
during a knock and talk. However, an officer should not need to 
shield her eyes so long as they are fixed on a legitimate purpose. 
Embracing a subjective standard that validates only those knock and 
talks performed with the legitimate purpose of an interview is in 
keeping with North Carolina precedent.161 It would constrain an 
officer’s activities to conduct that a homeowner would impliedly 
consent to and would reduce the privacy interests surrendered by the 
homeowner to the minimum required for the officer to do his job. 
Although subjective standards are difficult to apply—because it is 
easy for an officer to lie about why she went to a certain location and 
courts often defer to officer testimony—the specificity of the knock 
and talk protocol makes subjective intent relatively easy to discern. If 
the officer deviates from the path to the door, performs an unusual 
action, or delays unnecessarily, it will alert the court that the officer 
 
 156. United States v. Munoz-Guerra, 788 F.2d 295, 299 (5th Cir. 1986). 
 157. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1416 (2013). 
 158. Id. at 1415–17. 
 159. See Grice, 367 N.C. at 754–55, 767 S.E.2d at 314–15. 
 160. See id. 
 161. Id. at 757, 767 S.E.2d at 316. 
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has also turned away from the legitimate purpose and therefore 
breached the implied license. 
C. Homeowners’ Reasonable Expectation of Privacy 
Lastly and perhaps most dangerously, the Grice court seems to 
treat implied license doctrine as an exception to the rule articulated in 
Jardines: Reasonable expectations of privacy may protect areas 
unprotected under the traditional property theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, but the absence of such expectations of privacy cannot 
negate Fourth Amendment protections “when the Government does 
engage in [a] physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected 
area[.]”162 Yet the implied license doctrine seems to permit seizures of 
property within plain view of the curtilage between a public street and 
the front door, precisely because there is neither a subjective 
expectation of privacy nor an objectively recognized privacy interest 
in such an area.163 Objectively low expectations of privacy do not 
subtract from Fourth Amendment protection of private areas, 
including the home; this baseline protection is all that guards the 
people against the government invading all areas of privacy by 
announcing Orwellian searches and surveillance.164 If searches like 
those performed in Grice or the Ninth Circuit cases mentioned were 
to become commonplace, Americans could suffer significantly 
 
 162. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1409, 1414 (emphasis removed) (quoting United States v. 
Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 286 (1983) (Brennan, J., concurring)). 
 163. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990); Grice, 367 N.C. at 757–58, 767 
S.E.2d at 316–17. 
 164. See Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (“Situations can be imagined, 
of course, in which Katz’s two-pronged inquiry would provide an inadequate index of 
Fourth Amendment protection. For example, if the Government were suddenly to 
announce on nationwide television that all homes henceforth would be subject to 
warrantless entry, individuals thereafter might not in fact entertain any actual expectation 
of privacy regarding their homes, papers, and effects. Similarly, if a refugee from a 
totalitarian country, unaware of this Nation’s traditions, erroneously assumed that police 
were continuously monitoring his telephone conversations, a subjective expectation of 
privacy regarding the contents of his calls might be lacking as well. In such circumstances, 
where an individual’s subjective expectations had been ‘conditioned’ by influences alien to 
well-recognized Fourth Amendment freedoms, those subjective expectations obviously 
could play no meaningful role in ascertaining what the scope of Fourth Amendment 
protection was.”); cf. Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for 
Fourth Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 583–87 (1989) (arguing the Supreme 
Court has favored law enforcement over privacy); GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 211–12 
(1949) (“A Party member lives from birth to death under the eye of the Thought Police. 
Even when he is alone he can never be sure that he is alone. Wherever he may be, asleep 
or awake, working or resting, in his bath or in bed, he can be inspected without warning 
and without knowing that he is being inspected.”). 
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diminished privacy in their backyards and homes.165 Everything not 
shuttered away behind curtain-drawn windows would be considered 
in plain sight. 
V.  RECOMMENDATIONS 
To preserve and perhaps restore the privacy interests guarded by 
the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of North Carolina and 
the North Carolina General Assembly should take four concrete steps 
to establish workable, safe boundaries for the protection of privacy in 
the home. First, North Carolina should adopt a “categorical 
approach” to privacy protections, as recommended by Justice 
Hudson’s dissent in State v. Grice;166 second, the State should establish 
a fixed and reasonable protocol to govern the actions of implied 
licensees, particularly law enforcement officers; third, the State 
should reemphasize Katz’s expectation of privacy analysis; and 
fourth, the State should limit the purposes for which an officer may 
enter Fourth Amendment protected property without a warrant. 
There could conceivably be many other standards that would serve 
this same purpose, but these recommendations are drawn from the 
principles and suggestions highlighted by Justice Hudson and various 
U.S. Supreme Court Justices as important. 
A. Adopt a Categorical Approach to Privacy Protections 
Adopting a categorical approach to privacy protections, as 
recommended by Justice Hudson’s dissent in State v. Grice,167 would 
increase privacy protections in North Carolina. Justice Hudson notes 
that an officer who is “located outside of a constitutionally protected 
area and is looking inside that area” is engaged in a “pre-intrusion” 
observation.168 A categorical approach would distinguish between 
“open view” and “plain view” observations. Observations of 
contraband made from a “pre-intrusion” standpoint are properly 
classified as “open view” and not “plain view” observations.169 The 
substantive difference between an “open view” and “plain view” 
observation is that an “open view” observation does not occur from 
within the Fourth Amendment protected area and does not confer a 
right of access to the object; instead, an “open view” observation 
 
 165. See supra notes 149–50. 
 166. Grice, 367 N.C. at 767–68, 767 S.E.2d at 322 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 767, 767 S.E.2d at 322; see Ensor v. State, 403 So. 2d 349, 352 (Fla. 1981). 
 169. Ensor, 403 So. 2d at 352. 
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merely confers probable cause.170 When law enforcement sees 
contraband in “open view”—i.e., from outside the protected area—
the law requires a warrant or exigent circumstances to justify entering 
the Fourth Amendment protected area.171 
As Justice Hudson noted in her dissent, applying the “open 
view” doctrine could transform the outcome of cases like Grice.172 
The license by which the detectives entered the defendant’s land 
limited their lawful access to specific parts of the curtilage.173 This 
strongly suggests that until the officers spotted the plants in the 
backyard and left the driveway, there was no prior valid intrusion of 
that part of the curtilage.174 Consequently, absent exigent 
circumstances such an intrusion of the Fourth Amendment protected 
property would not be permitted under the “open view” doctrine.175 
B. Establish a Fixed Protocol 
Establishing a fixed protocol for how licensees operate ensures 
that courts do not condone violating the Constitution. Under 
Jardines, certain extreme acts exceed the scope of an implied license; 
these include “peer[ing] into the house through binoculars,”176 
investigating the curtilage with trained drug-detection dogs,177 and 
observing the home with a “thermal-imaging device.”178 Preventing 
officers from doing more than approaching the front door, knocking, 
and leaving if not invited to stay longer would go a long way toward 
preventing blatant violations of the license’s scope.179 When officers 
deviate from this protocol, courts should focus on whether such 
activity is customary in light of the “habits of the country[.]”180 
Allowing only those actions that are “customary, usual, reasonable, 
 
 170. See id. 
 171. See Taylor v. United States, 286 U.S. 1, 6 (1932). 
 172. Grice, 367 N.C. at 767–68, 767 S.E.2d at 322 (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 173. See Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1422 (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“A 
visitor cannot traipse through the garden, meander into the backyard, or take other 
circuitous detours that veer from the pathway that a visitor would customarily use.”); see 
also, e.g., United States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 679–80 (8th Cir. 2011) (refusing to permit 
knock and talks when police forgo the knock at the front door and proceed directly to the 
backyard); Robinson v. Virginia, 625 S.E.2d 651, 659 (Va. Ct. App. 2006) (en banc) 
(finding that the officer was within the implied license as he walked up the driveway of the 
defendant’s house). 
 174. See supra Section II.A. 
 175. LAFAVE, supra note 57, §	2.3(f). 
 176. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 n.3. 
 177. Id. at 1417–18. 
 178. Id. at 1419. 
 179. Id. at 1415. 
 180. See id. 
94 N.C. L. REV. 1354 (2016) 
2016] STATE V. GRICE & IMPLIED LICENSES 1379 
respectful, ordinary, typical, [or] nonalarming”181 would force police 
to conform more precisely to what homeowners expect and invite. 
In the same vein, North Carolina could stand to learn from 
jurisdictions that recognize the limits of the implied license. Other 
jurisdictions limit the plain view (and open view)182 doctrine, 
particularly when officers “employ a particularly intrusive method of 
viewing.”183 Such jurisdictions recognize a number of factors for 
determining whether an officer exceeds an implied license, such as 
whether the officer acts secretly, the time of day that the entry occurs, 
and whether the officer actually attempts to talk with the resident.184 
Employing these factors in the Fourth Amendment analysis—and 
continuing to recognize other factors when relevant—would allow a 
body of case law to develop that would guide officers in how to act on 
private property and instruct property owners on how much privacy 
they can expect. 
C. Reemphasize the Katz Analysis 
As previously explained, courts around the nation are shifting 
their emphasis from the person-centric expectation of privacy analysis 
espoused in Katz to an increasingly property-based analysis.185 This 
Recent Development suggests reversing this shift. The trend in legal 
reasoning culminating in Jardines (and even more so in Grice) 
overemphasizes property rights and divorces analyses of licenses from 
their proper basis: the reasonable expectation of privacy.186 Ever since 
Dunn, courts increasingly employ license analyses in lieu of the 
“reasonable expectation of privacy test.”187 Indeed, on paper, the two 
tests are strikingly similar. After all, if an action is allowed by the 
 
 181. Id. at 1416 n.2. 
 182. The difference between open view and plain view is that, in open view, the 
observation is made from outside rather than from within the Fourth Amendment protected 
area. State v. Grice, 367 N.C. 753, 767, 767 S.E.2d 312, 322 (2015) (Hudson, J., dissenting). 
 183. State v. Cada, 923 P.2d 469, 477 (Idaho Ct. App. 1996). 
 184. See, e.g., State v. Myers, 815 P.2d 761, 769 (Wash. 1991) (en banc) (listing seven 
factors used in determining whether an officer exceeded the scope of “open view”); State v. 
Seagull, 632 P.2d 44, 48–49 (Wash. 1981) (en banc) (finding that the officer was not acting 
secretively in approaching a house). 
 185. See supra Section I.B. 
 186. See George M. Dery III, Failing to Keep “Easy Cases Easy”: Florida v. Jardines 
Refuses to Reconcile Inconsistencies in Fourth Amendment Privacy Law by Instead Focusing 
on Physical Trespass, 47 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 451, 467 (2014) (criticizing Jardines for 
“eschew[ing] Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy analysis	.	.	.	[and] return[ing] to a 
property-rights test”). The baseline of the Fourth Amendment’s protections is not property 
rights, but rather something much more fundamental: “the right to be let alone.” See id. at 
470 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)). 
 187. See supra Section I.B. 
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“habits of the country,”188 it is almost certainly an action that “society 
is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’	”189 But a property-based 
analysis largely confines Fourth Amendment protections to the home 
and curtilage and leaves objects left in barns, open fields, and certain 
other places unprotected, even if their owners and society could 
reasonably expect such things to be private.190 Reemphasizing the 
Katz analysis would provide greater protection to privacy interests 
outside the home where both individuals and society consider it 
reasonable. 
D. Limit the Purposes of Implied Licenses 
The courts could also shore up Fourth Amendment protections 
by limiting the purposes for which any person—including a police 
officer—may enter Fourth Amendment protected property. Jardines 
largely already requires this: “[t]he scope of a license	.	.	.	is limited not 
only to a particular area but also to a specific purpose.”191 However, 
some courts may be tempted to reason that permitting an officer to 
enter Fourth Amendment protected property “for the purpose of a 
general inquiry or interview”192 would also permit that officer to enter 
the property for the “purpose of discovering information.”193 
However, “discovering information” is a broader purpose than 
“discovering information by speaking to the occupant.”194 The courts 
should closely supervise lower courts that attempt to permit searches 
made with a general intent to discover information. Societal 
expectations dictate the permissible purposes for approaching a 
home—usually to approach the front door only.195 The Fourth 
Amendment limits knock and talks to this accepted custom. 
 
 188. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1415 (2013). 
 189. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 190. See supra notes 58–66 and accompanying text. 
 191. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1416 (emphasis added). 
 192. State v. Lupek, 214 N.C. App. 146, 151, 712 S.E.2d 915, 919 (2011) (quoting State v. 
Prevette, 43 N.C. App. 450, 455, 259 S.E.2d 595, 599–600 (1979)). It should also be noted that 
once a legitimate purpose is extinguished, either by its achievement or frustration, the license 
is also extinguished. Cf. id. at 152, 712 S.E.2d at 920 (“Defendant repeatedly insists that Ms. 
Sweatt tried to shut the door on Deputy Carroll	.	.	.	.	The trial court, however, found that Ms. 
Sweatt tried to shut the door only after Deputy Carroll was on the porch and had already 
seen the bong.”); State v. Prevette, 43 N.C. App. 450, 455, 259 S.E.2d 595, 599 (1979) 
(“Entrance onto private property for the purpose of a general inquiry or interview is 
proper.”). 
 193. See Jardines, 133 S. Ct. at 1424 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
 194. See id. at 1416 n.4 (majority opinion) (“The dissent argues, citing King, that 
‘gathering evidence—even damning evidence—is a lawful activity that falls within the scope 
of the license to approach.’ That is a false generalization.” (citation omitted)). 
 195. Id. at 1415. 
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The above recommendations would help conform North 
Carolina’s rules for police conduct more closely to the strictures of 
the Fourth Amendment. Accordingly, homeowners would more fully 
enjoy the protections of the home and the Constitution, and police 
would not be impeded in carrying out their duties—for in many cases, 
not much more will be required of them beyond acquiring a warrant. 
CONCLUSION 
The dangers inherent in Grice stem from the decision’s lack of 
clarity and thorough analysis. Jardines establishes that there are limits 
to the scope of an implied license.196 The Grice court need not have 
precisely implemented the above suggestions, but the court had a 
duty to apply the principles handed down by Jardines in a more 
meaningful way. Unconstrained police information gathering cannot 
be excused by using implied license doctrine as a battering ram 
against Fourth Amendment protections.197 
Permitting invitees to engage in activities a guest never would 
and for purposes a homeowner would never condone contradicts the 
rationale underlying implied license doctrine. The people of North 
Carolina deserve a clearer answer to the question: by opening my 
home to guests, how much privacy do I give away? If Grice’s line of 
reasoning continues, the only way to revoke the implied invitation to 
police to circle the home, knock on every door and peer in every 
window, is to fortify the home with barricades, gates, and high 
fences.198 The home is a man’s castle, and if the Fourth Amendment 
does not defend it, homeowners may build walls, gates, and moats 
instead. 
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